The Missing Piece: Empowerment of Roma Grassroots Organisations in EU Roma Integration Policies. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/10/December 2014

Summary. The fourth edition of Roma Pride has brought Roma civic activism back in the spotlight. This Roma-rights mobilization, taking place every October in several European cities, has emphasized the centrality of an active civil society in pursuing a successful integration of the Roma in Europe. The ‘Award for Roma Integration’ and the ‘Civil Society Prize 2014’ conferred last October by the European Union (EU) to Roma and pro-Roma Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have confirmed this approach. Nonetheless, a general discontent towards the EU Roma Integration Policies exists within the Roma Civil Society, who calls for stronger support to and the promotion of “Romaled change”. This Policy Brief investigates the reasons behind such discontent and identifies the ‘distance’ from Roma communities as the Achilles heel of EU policies. It argues for further efforts by the EU to empower Roma organisations operating at the grassroots through community capacity building, structured dialogue and simplification of the funding mechanisms.

Mid-term Evaluation of the 2009-14 European Parliament: Legislative activity and decision-making dynamics. CEPS Special Report, 23 July 2012

This special report analyses legislative activity in the European Union and coalition formation in the European Parliament (EP) during the first half of the 7th legislative term, 2009-14. Co-decision is now the ordinary legislative procedure, not by name only: it was deployed on 90% of new proposals in 2010 and 86% in 2011, which suggests that the EP is now more influential than ever. There are differences in the degree of empowerment across committees, however. This report looks at the legislative workload of selected committees as an indicator of change in their influence, identifying which of them won and which lost out in terms of the quantity and type of legislation they tackle.

The Arab Spring: A Litmus Test for the EU’s Women’s Rights Policy in the Euro-Mediterranean Area? Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Paper 1/2013

The promotion of women’s rights is described as a priority within the external action of the European Union (EU). As a result of the Arab Spring uprisings which have been ongoing since 2011, democracy and human rights have been pushed to the forefront of European policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean region. The EU could capitalise on these transformations to help positively reshape gender relations or it could fail to adapt. Thus, the Arab Spring can be seen to serve as a litmus test for the EU’s women’s rights policy. This paper examines how and to what extent the EU diffuses women’s rights in this region, by using Ian Manners’ ‘Normative Power Europe’ as the conceptual framework. It argues that while the EU tries to behave as a normative force for women’s empowerment by way of ‘informational diffusion’, ‘transference’ ‘procedural diffusion’ and ‘overt diffusion’; its efforts could, and should, be strengthened. There are reservations over the EU’s credibility, choice of engagement and its commitment in the face of security and ideological concerns. Moreover, it seems that the EU focuses more intently on women’s political rights than on their social and economic freedoms.

On Incentives in Technology Policymaking: What the EU Can Learn from U.S. Developments. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.7, 1997

This paper explores the incentives political and bureaucratic actors face in the institutional setting of EU technology policy. In examining the implications and assumptions of neoclassical and evolutionary theories of technological change, it tries to answer why certain theories do not obtain importance in the political wor1d. By focusing on the positive approach to policymaking, the paper examines why policy learning does not occur m certain institutional settings. In referring to EU technology programs, I show which conceptual and functional shortcomings limit the policies in question. As evaluation and oversight mechanisms have not been sufficiently developed and accepted within the institutional setting, there is much room for inefficiency. I discuss this setting within a simple agency model using two political actors and two firms performing R&D. It is easy to show that when asymmetric information applies, the firms receive positive rents and the political agent gains reputation. The outcome suggests changing the evaluation practices and embedding results in political decision making. Regarding this point, recent U.S. developments seem to have led to more efficiency. Moreover, the paper suggests delegating technology policy to other actors and discussing the empowerment of different principals on the political plane.